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MORAL AND JUDICIAL REASONING:
A STRUCTURAL ANALOGY*
THoMAs

T he jurisprudential

D.

PERRYt

question of whether and by what reasoning

judges can legally justify their decisions in difficult cases has
an obvious analogue in the "metaethical" question: "What do moral
statements really mean and how (if at all) can they be verified or
falsified?" There are obvious similarities between ethical theories concerned with the latter question and various theories of the judicial
process. One notices certain affinities between ethical intuitionism,
for example, and a natural law approach to decision-making.' Ethical
relativism is similar in some respects to legal positivism, especially
John Austin's version. 2 The emotive theory of ethics bears striking
* This article is adapted from two chapters in a forthcoming book by Professor

Perry.

t Associate Professor of Philosophy, State University of New York at Buffalo. Member, New York Bar. B.A., University of Buffalo, 1949; J.D., 1949; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1966.
1. Some natural law theorists suggest that when a case is not unambiguously determined by statute and precedent, the judge may still be able to find the correct
decision by consulting an objective moral order which exists independently of human
convention or legislative fiat. Cf. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L.
REv. 376 (1946). The ethical intuitionist also believes in such an order, although he
differs somewhat in explaining how we are supposed to get to know it, and how it
determines the answers to moral questions confronting us. He says (typically) that most
people maturing as social beings develop a capacity to recognize without argument
(to "intuit") the "moral significance," which various "natural" (descriptive, nonevaluative) characteristics of human actions and other subjects of moral evaluation
have. Reasoning to support one's moral judgment about something will then simply
consist of giving such morally relevant descriptions and verifying them. One's interlocutor will feel the force of such reasons if his own moral faculty is adequately developed. For a classic statement see Prichard, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?,
21 MIND 21 (1912). The natural law theorist, on the other hand, says that we can
ascertain the "objective purposes" of "natural ends" of human life and institutions
(traditionally, ends laid down by the Author of nature), and use them as guides to the
right moral decision, whether in a doubtful legal case or elsewhere. But, since both of
these explanations are quite obscure (one could scarcely imagine what sort of evidence or
analysis should confirm or refute them), an unkind critic might think they come to
much the same thing-mere reiteration in mythical terms of the conviction (which
may possibly be true even so) that moral decisions (including legal decisions "in the
gaps") can be objectively correct or incorrect. Another classic of ethical intuitionism is
W. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930).
2. According to Austin, the judge applies the general orders of the sovereign, be
they good, bad or indifferent orders from this or that moral point of view, and he holds
that a judge engaging in judicial legislation is the sovereign's delegate, so that his decision and the rule it generates are valid law for the jurisdiction, again regardless of
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resemblance to the earlier (and cruder) versions of legal realism,
its close contemporary. 3 It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that
students of jurisprudence have not been studying the ethicists' work
more closely in this connection. Looking through the law reviews
of the last two decades, I find an occasional article summarizing recent ethical theory, but the emphasis is upon possible lessons for
"ethical jurisprudence"-discussion of the ideals which the legal
order should be made to serve-rather than the analysis of judicial
reasoning. 4 There are a few good discussions of the latter topic by
authors familiar with recent moral philosophy,5 but the situation is
anyone's moral opinion. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED,
lectures i, v, vi (1832). Ethical relativism somewhat similarly holds that moral questions
are correctly answered by employing the moral rules that happen to be "in force"
in the society in which these questions arise, i.e., those rules which the majority of
people generally feel guilty about violating and condemn others for violating. "What is
right in one place may very well be wrong in another," whether one is speaking of moral
right with the ethical relativist or legal right with the legal positivist. There are few
defenders of ethical relativism in recent philosophy (as I have just used the term),
although it is frequently confused with the anthropological thesis that people of
different societies often have fundamentally different beliefs about what is morally right.
Two important works are E. WESTERMARCK, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
MORAL IDEAS (1906)
and E. WESTERIARCK, ETHICAL RELATIVITY (1932).
3. In these versions of legal realism, the judge decides all but the easiest cases
according to his own notion of the most desirable result, without thinking (if he is a
sophisticated and "fully adult" judge) that such result is logically demanded under
existing rules of law, and without thinking that there is any absolute moral basis for it
either. Cf. J. FRANx, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). The ethical emotivist thinks
a moral judgment is the expression of one's personal attitude, that it can very well
deviate from that of one's fellows without being false or irrational, and that there are
no such things as absolute moral standards. In moral reasoning we cite such facts and
common moral notions as are likely to influence our audience to adopt the same
attitude toward the subject of our moral judgment. This can only be psychological influence, not logical proof. Similarly, the legal realist maintains that in legal "reasoning"
we construct as plausible a rationale of facts and legal ideas as we can muster in the
case to persuade others of the desirability of our result. No doubt we also say (because
professional custom demands it) that the law really requires that result and excludes
any substantially contrary results. But this is like saying, "It isn't just that I disapprove
of his action and want you to agree with me; his action really is wrong!" "Pure
rhetoric," says the emotivist, "an extra dose of emotive meaning." Two leading statements are A. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC, ch. 6 (1935), and C. STEVENSON,
ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944).
4. See, e.g., Nakhnikian,

Contemporary Ethical Theories and Jurisprudence, 2

L. F. 4 (1957); Rose, Ethical Theory and Legal Philosophy, 15 VAND. L.
REV. 327 (1962). The former is a competent survey of theories to that date by a working philosopher. The latter is a long series of reflections by a practicing lawyer on his
reading in contemporary ethics.
5. E.g., Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment on the Two-Level
Theory of Decision, 74 YALE L. J. 640 (1965), which contains a slightly revised verNATURAL

sion of his review in Dworkin, Wasserstrom: The Judicial Decision, 75 ETHICS 47

(1964) of R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION (1961); Dworkin, The Model
of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967); Hyman, The Responsibility and Craftsman-
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quite different from what one finds in the philosophy journals where
many writers have followed the lead of H.L.A. Hart in using legal
materials for analytical work in ethics. 6
The broad comparison of theories which I have mentioned can
put the student of jurisprudence in touch with major conclusions
about moral reasoning which some fairly recent philosophers have
found plausible. But it would obviously be more useful to study the
analyses of moral concepts and arguments on which they have based
these conclusions, and to follow the course that ethical theory has
taken during the generation which has elapsed since the emotive
theory and legal realism were at the center of attention in their respective fields. 7 So broad and intensive a review cannot be undertaken
ship of the Judge: A Review of Julius Stone's "Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning,"
in Light of Recent Criticism of the Supreme Court, 14 BUFFALo L. REv. 347 (1965).
6. Philosophy articles dealing in some way with law have been extremely numerous
during the past twenty years, following a long period during which professional philosophers paid little attention to the subject. Some of the best work applies expert knowledge
of legal ideas and distinctions to the elucidation of moral concepts and reasoning. Outstanding examples are Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 171 (1949), and nine other articles collected in
H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968), some of which appeared
originally in philosophical publications. One article partly in this vein, Austin, A Plea
for Excuses, 57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1 (1957), is undoubtedly one of the most influential papers in twentieth-century philosophy. Many
philosophy articles deal with the judicial process as such, e.g., Boonin, The Meaning
and Existence of Rules, 76 ETHICS 212 (1966); Boonin, The Logic of Legal Decisions,
75 ETHICS 179 (1965); Dworkin, Wasserstrom: The judicial Decision, 75 ETHICS 47
(1965); Dworkin, judicial Discretion, 60 J. OF PHILOSOPHY 624 (1963); Golding,
Principled Judicial Decision-Making, 73 ETHICS 247 (1963); Perry, Judicial Method
and the Concept of Reasoning, 80 ETHICS 1 (1969), reprinted with minor revisions in
19 BUFFALO LAW REv. 225 (1970); Prevots, On the Nature of Legal Deliberations, 49
MONIST 424 (1965); Sartorius, The Justification of the Judicial Decision, 78 ETHICS
171 (1968). It should be added, however, that while legal writers have seldom discussed
the judicial process from the vantage point of contemporary ethical theory (one who
does is R. WASSERSTROm, THE JUDIcIAL DECISION (1961)), there are a number of
law review articles on specific legal-moral concepts, e.g., mens rea and moral responsibility. Many of these may be located by referring to Hart's pieces in the volume
cited earlier in this footnote. See also Brady, Abolish the Insanity Defense-No. ??, 8
HOUSTON L. REV. 629 (1971); Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due
Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REv. 322 (1966), which make
extensive use of contemporary moral philosophy.
7. Hundreds of articles and scores of books on ethics have appeared during this
period. Some important foci of discussion have been provided by R. HARE, THE
LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952). The author avoids many of the crudities of emotivism in
arguing that moral judgments are neither true nor false, but rather, consistent or inconsistent applications of one's personal principles. His position was developed further in
R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963). Hare's theory has provoked two main types of
response, one seeking to identify objective principles through analysis of morality as an
institution, the other attempting to show that moral statements can be deduced directly
from verified statements of fact, i.e., without appealing to principles for one's "major
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here, but I think we can improve our understanding of judicial reasoning by philosophizing a bit for our own account. Avoiding technical
jargon wherever possible, let us consider what a sound moral argument would be like, and then observe the features it may have in common with judicial reasoning. I hope in this way to point out similarities which do cast light on the question of whether judges can really
justify their decisions in problematic cases. The analogy may prove
enlightening for moral philosophy as well.
I.
While some philosophers have argued that moral utterances are
neither true nor false, and others, less extremely, have insisted that
there is no way to show conclusively that a moral statement is true
or false, common sense teaches otherwise. In philosophy, as elsewhere,
common usage and opinion are at least entitled to presumptive
weight-they have served us well enough to leave the burden of proof
with their competitors. It may readily be granted that safely demonstrative arguments will be rare in problems of any difficulty, where
sincere differences of moral opinion can easily occur. But it seems
obvious that one could demonstrate a great many moral judgments
on very easy questions where there is no such disagreement and, hence,
no practical need for demonstration. One writer expresses the point
in the following terms:
One could argue conclusively that some course of action would
premises." No one would claim that either project has been successfully carried through
to date. The first figures prominently in Foot, Moral Arguments, 67 MIND 502
(1958); Foot, Moral Beliefs, 59 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 83 (1959);
G. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY (1971). There is a notable criticism of Foot
in Phillips & Mounce, On Morality's Having a Point, 40 PHILOSOPHY 308 (1965).
The second line of thought is developed in Anscombe, On Brute Facts, 18 ANALYSIS 69
(1958); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3 (1955); Searle,
How to Derive "Ought" from "Is", 73 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 43 (1964). These two
tendencies in recent "metaethics" (or theory of the meaning and justification of moral
statements) return, at a higher level of sophistication, to a metaethical position (ethical
naturalism) often attributed to the nineteenth century legal positivists and utilitarian
publicists in their arguments for law reform and parliamentary reform, etc. (although
it is doubtful whether they in fact held it). Metaethics may be said to begin with G. E.
Moore's criticism of that position in PRINciPiA ETHICA (1903). Three good collections
are ETHICS (J. Thomson & G. Dworkin eds. 1968); THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION (W.
Hudson ed. 1969); READINGS IN ETHICAL THEORY (W. Sellars & J. Hospers eds., 2d ed.,
1970). An excellent, but now dated textbook is R. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY (1959).
See also G. KERNER, THE REVOLUTION IN ETHICAL THEORY (1966).
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be, say, morally wrong if one could show that that course of action
would lead quite certainly to certain consequences, which would constitute indisputably some serious harm to some innocent person or
persons, and that there would accrue quite certainly no good to anyone which could possibly be held to outweigh those harmful consequences. It is not that there are no cases which satisfy these conditions; it could be shown, for instance, with this sort of conclusiveness that it would be morally wrong for me to induce in my children
addiction to heroin. But, of course, when all the relevant considerations point indisputably one way, it is unlikely to occur to anyone that
the argument is worth stating; the question, in fact, is scarcely likely
ever to be raised. Nevertheless, that such an argument, if stated,
could be really demonstrative, seems to me clear; and anyone who,
if such an argument is put to him, denies that the conclusion follows-who holds, while conceding the facts, that, for instance, it
would not be morally wrong for me to induce in my children addiction to heroin--shows either that he has not really followed the
argument, or that he does not know what 'morally wrong' means.8
Let us take the moral judgment referred to in this passage
and attempt to demonstrate it in the way the author evidently intends. If I understand him correctly, the argument would run as
follows:
(1) Other things being equal, it is morally wrong to cause
serious harm to innocent persons.
(2) Inducing in my children addiction to heroin would
quite certainly lead to consequences that constitute indisputably serious harm to innocent persons.
(3) Certainly, no good would accrue to anyone which could
be held to outweigh those harmful consequences.
(Therefore) It would be morally wrong for me to induce
in my children addiction to heroin.
The last statement does follow conclusively (deductively) from
the premises, at least if we rewrite premise (3) to read: "(3)'
There is nothing about the present case which could be held to justify
causing those harmful consequences; that is to say, other things
are equal." Now, since premises (2) and (3)' are undoubtedly true,
and since it would be rather strange for anyone to question the
moral principle expressed by premise (1), the argument seems to
8. G.

WARNOCK, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY

70 (1967).
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be demonstrative, i.e., a valid deduction from premises known to
be true.
Is the form of such an argument similar to the form of legal
arguments? I think most modem writers would answer that in law
we of course do have such easy applications of rules, but that this
would be a very misleading model for legal reasoning generally and
especially for judicial reasoning. People with no previous familiarity
with law may begin their studies with such a model in mind, but
they soon learn that simple deductive reasoning will not suffice as a
defense of one's answers to legal questions that are at all problematic,
such as the issues in litigated cases. Even the early positivists, who
have been much maligned in this regard, never believed that the
"sovereign's rules" can be identified by judges so easily or applied in
so "mechanical" a fashion. 9
For reasons that I shall explain in section III of this paper, I
agree that legal reasoning is not simply a matter of deductive inference. But first I wish to point out that while there could hardly be
an easier moral question than whether such a course of action toward
the children would be wrong, and while the argument set out above
is a very simple deduction, the reasoning which supports the conclusion that it would be wrong is certainly more complex than may appear at first glance. This is because, in addition to having a deductively valid argument, we also have to know that the premises of
the argument are true. Even in a case that is as easy, psychologically
speaking, as this one, it develops that how we know they are true
is a fairly complicated logical story. Certainly, in a practical sense
there would be no need to spell out the reasoning involved; no one
would ask us how we know the premises are true in this case. However, such a question is analytically feasible, and it will be helpful
for present purposes to consider how it should be answered.
As for the first premise, I would agree with Warnock that anyone seriously questioning it could not be said to know what "morally
wrong" means. However, I am unable to explain just how the meaning
of that phrase is connected to "causes serious harm to innocent persons," nor, to my knowledge, has anyone managed to explain this
adequately. 10 While premise (1) surely is self-evident, note that with9. See H.L.A. Hart's defense of John Austin on this point in Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 606-15 (1958).
10. Some recent suggestions by able philosophers will be found in the articles and
books by Foot and Warnock, supra note 7.
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out its "other things being equal" clause it would not be self-evident
but obviously too general and false. To use an unpleasant but precise example, it might be necessary and right to shoot a lunatic to
keep him from blowing up a trainload of innocent people in the
next moment. The avoidance of harm to innocent people seems somehow essential to morality in that it cannot be left out of account in
moral evaluation. That an action avoids such harm does not suffice
to make it right, though it counts in its favor, and that an action
harms innocent persons does not suffice to make it wrong in all circumstances, though it counts against it and always tends to make it
wrong.
At first glance premise (2) looks like a proposition of fact that
could be easily verified. For the sake of the illustration, we may suppose that the children are very young and, thus, innocent by definition. We may also safely assume that heroin addiction would be physically deleterious to them and/or severely disruptive of their normal
development in the society in which they were born and where they
will have to live. But more on premise (2) in a moment.
As for premise (3)', Warnock would no doubt be entirely justified in asserting that other things are equal in this case. Certainly I
would be justified if the example referred to me and my children.
There is just nothing about my children or their relationships to
other people, etc., which even remotely suggests that there could
be any good consequence of causing them to become addicted, or
that for some other reason I ought to cause them to become addicted.
They have no disease which can only be treated with addictive doses
of heroin; there is no religious doctrine or bit of revelation which I
(or, I think, anyone) believes according to which it is my duty, like
Abraham, to cause them this harm; and so on. Now, while it seems
entirely correct to say we know that premise (3)' is true, it should
be noticed that (3)' is an evaluative statement, and that its truth
seems to be assured by the fact that we are justified beyond any rational
doubt in asserting or accepting it. It is not a purely descriptive statement which can be empirically verified, although its truth does depend in part on the truth of other, verifiable propositions. This can
be seen more easily, perhaps, if we take a closer look at the grounds
for asserting or accepting it.
The answer to the question of why Warnock would be justified
in asserting premise (3)' should go somewhat as follows. He is in
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a position to know all about the case, to have a sufficiently thorough
knowledge of any facts that might be relevant to the rightness or
wrongness of the course of action described. Hence, he would no
doubt be aware of any fact that could possibly constitute a countervailing reason (a reason cancelling or weighing against its wrongness).
Being imaginatively attentive to the facts of the case, and considering
the matter impartially and calmly, he is aware of no such fact or
reason. But it is not just that none of the facts of the case strike him
as such a reason. Since the argument is to justify a moral judgment and
is not merely a consistent adherence to his own preferences, he must
feel that none of the facts should strike anyone as such a reason, at least
not as a sufficient reason. Now, when Warnock attends to the other
facts of the case other than the harmfulness of such a course of conduct, and judges their moral significance to be nil, this is just as
much an evaluative judgment as if he had found some fact in the
case to have weight, but of insufficient quantum, to justify such
action. This evaluation is justified and true beyond question because
no sane person, situated as he is, and being fully informed and attentive to the facts of the case, would judge any differently."
11. I think the last two paragraphs can stand on their own feet, but it may be
helpful to relate them to some well known discussions in the philosophical literature.
In his widely discussed article, supra note 7, Searle argues that while the statement
"other things are equal" is often evaluative, sometimes it is not. He maintains that "the
force" of the ceteris paribus phrase is that, unless we are prepared to give a countervailing reason, the general statement to which it is attached remains valid. One such
statement in his derivation is the tautology that (other things being equal) one ought
to do what one is under an obligation to do. So in a case where we are not so prepared,
it follows from this nonevaluative fact, plus the fact that Jones is under an obligation
to pay Smith five dollars, that Jones ought to pay. But in Thomson & Thomson, How
Not to Derive "Ought" from "Is", 73 PHILOSOPHICAL REv. 512 (1964), the authors

point out that from the fact that we are not prepared to give a reason why Jones ought
not to pay it doesn't follow that he ought to pay. In order to deduce that conclusion
from (1) the derived fact that he is under an obligation to pay, and (2) the tautology
that (other things being equal) one ought to do what one is under an obligation to do,
we need as our further premise (3) the universally negative proposition: "There is
nothing sufficient to make it false that Jones ought to pay," which surely is evaluative.
Thus, Searle is not successful in his attempt to derive "Jones ought to pay Smith five
dollars" from premises which include only empirical facts and tautologies, without
evaluative statements. (His attempt in J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE
to rectify things by eliminating the cteris
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969)
paribus phrase is unsuccessful in my opinion, but it would be too far afield to discuss
here.) The Thomsons go on to observe that, while from the fact that no one is prepared
to give a reason to the contrary we may be entitled to take it that Jones ought to pay
(citing the famous paper: Austin, Other Minds, in LooC AND REALITY 148 (Aristotelian
Soe'y ed. 1946)), there is, after all, no such entailment (strict deductive implication)

as Searle's project demands. It is this kind of "entitlement" that my discussion in the text
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Notice that contrary evaluations here are not logically excluded.
Rather, it is apparent that highly eccentric evaluations such as those
of some madman who thinks it a father's duty to cause his children
to become addicted will be psychologically excluded (will seem obviously unacceptable) to almost anyone who views the matter from
the "moral point of view"-that is, when well informed, imaginatively attentive, unbiased, and in a calm and otherwise psychologically
normal state of mind. (Since it is tiresome to repeat this list of adjectives and adverbial phrases at each appropriate occasion, I shall hereafter say "informed and impartially reflective" or just "properly
reflective.")
There are eccentric opinions not only about what sorts of considerations could justify inflicting serious harm upon the innocent,
but also about what constitutes harm in the first place. Bearing this
in mind, it can be seen that premise (2) of the argument also has
its evaluative aspect. For all I know there are people (perhaps some
addicts with an easy and secure source of supply) who think daily
euphoria from heroin is, on the whole, a great enhancement of life
despite the disadvantage of addiction. Far from agreeing that there are
no countervailing considerations in our hypothetical case, such people
would not even regard addiction as harmful. One might even imagine
a society in which the highest honors and privileges are reserved for
a priestly caste of life-long heroin addicts. In such a society, the great
honor of addiction might count as a prima facie justification for causing one's children to become addicted. But Warnock, being the sort
of person he is, living in the sort of society he does, and having the
sort of feelings he has about the physically and socially damaging effects
of heroin addiction, would dismiss such considerations as ridiculous;
he would see nothing but harmful consequences. This would be a very
exploits. If we are not prepared to give any countervailing reasons, and indeed know of
none after properly informing ourselves and considering the facts in a fairminded way,
then we are justified in believing (entitled to believe) the universally negative statement appearing as premise (3). If we are also justified in believing the other two
premises, then we are justified in believing the particular moral statement which the
three premises entail. To give sufficient reasons for believing the three premises would
therefore be to give a complete rational justification of our moral judgment stated in the
conclusion. This is easy to do for premises (2) and (3), and maybe "It is self-evident"
is a sufficient reason for believing premise (1). After all, it is self-evident, even though
an explanation of that (why it is self-evident) is lacking. Finally, to be completely justified in believing something, is not the same thing as knowing that it is true; but on this
see section II of the text infra.
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reasonable judgment on his part which could be justified in the same
manner in which we have just seen that premise (3)' can be justified.
Indeed, the two judgments overlap: finding no beneficial effects for
the children is part of finding no factual considerations indicating
values to offset the harm which would be done to them.
These, then, are the ways in which we know that the premises
of the argument set out above are true. In concluding this section,
it should be noted that the second premise of a moral inferencethat which gives the principal description of the subject of our moral
judgment-may be purely descriptive and often will be. For example,
such an inference may begin with the premise that it is wrong, other
things being equal, to cause severe physical pain to someone, which
may then be followed with the purely descriptive premise that such
and such an action does so. But it seems clear that the third premise,
"other things are equal," will always be evaluative. Two observations
compel this conclusion. First, even if no one is prepared to offer
reasons to offset the moral consequence of the principal description,
we still must have judged that the moral significance of all other
pertinent descriptions is nil, as noted above. Secondly, the ceteris
paribus clause in a moral rule or principle cannot be construed as the
equivalent of a closed list of exceptions with fixed weights so that
whether there are any countervailing considerations sufficient to override the effect of the principal description would be a purely empirical question in each case.1 2 Finally, the third premise will always, or
nearly always, be needed in a moral inference because hardly any
moral principle (hardly any candidate for premise (1)) will be
safely true without a ceteris paribus proviso. For example, it is wrong
to tell a lie (or to steal, cheat, rape or kill), but perhaps not absolutely so, not in every conceivable circumstance.
12. In contrast to the "open" ceteris paribus clause which we must affix to most
and perhaps all standards in moral reasoning, notice how a "closed" ceteris paribus
clause figures in the following inference: "(1) Other things being equal, a batter who
has taken three strikes is out; (2) Jones has taken three strikes; (3) Other things are
equal (i.e., it is not the case that the catcher has missed or dropped the ball and failed

to tag Jones or throw him out at first base, period); Therefore, Jones is out," Here,

"other things are equal" is a verifiable, non-evaluative statement because the rule book
provides these and only these exceptions to the rule, and their effect is absolute.

Although there are well recognized exceptions to familiar moral rules, their effect in a

particular case is often not absolute but variable; moreover, there is always room for
disagreement on just what the exceptions are, whether certain new exceptions ought
now to be recognized in light of changing moral sentiments, etc.
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II.
If there is any such thing as true moral judgment and reasoning
sufficient to establish it, then surely we have seen an example of both
in section I. Moreover, the illustration suggests something very interesting about the concept of truth in morals and its relationship to
the notion of justified judgment. It seems to show that "justified" is
the more fundamental notion and that "true" is dependent on itrather than the reverse, as one might expect from their apparent relationship in nonevaluative subject matters. When we are referring to
questions of empirical fact, for example, it seems obvious that truth
is independent of justified belief. That is, a factual proposition may
be true whether or not anyone knows it or believes it or justifiably
believes it. It may be true even if no one having access to all the evidence that could possibly be made available would or should believe
it, as where all such evidence is highly misleading.'3 But, in our
paradigm case of unquestionably true moral judgment, that situation seems to be reversed. One is justified in thinking such a course
of conduct wrong if (a) one has reflected properly, and (b) the relevant facts (and principles whereby they are relevant) make one feel
that it is wrong. Nothing else in the example would make this a true
judgment except the fact that anyone who might do the same would
be practically certain to concur. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what
else moral truth could consist of but that, at least if one rejects the
notion that morality is the product of some absolute legislative
authority. 14
The idea here is not that the moral truth about something is
whatever the great majority of people think about it or would think
about it if asked. It is rather that a moral proposition is true if and
13. While most philosophers would concur in this statement, there are some who
approach the central puzzles of traditional epistemology by questioning it. Cf. Pollock,
What is an Epistemological Problem? 5 AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 183 (1968).
14. The proposition that some person or institution could issue moral principles
which would be binding as moral principles on all other responsible adults, even against
their own best moral judgment, would generally be thought obnoxious unless such
person or institution were regarded as God's delegate for moral legislation. Of course,
many people would eliminate the latter possibility as mythical (God being a myth and/or
the alleged delegation being a myth). But even those who continue to think of morality
as "God's Law" will find much trouble, on reflection, with the idea that God makes
something right or wrong by approving or disapproving of it rather than merely saying
infallibly that something is right (or wrong) when it is right (or wrong) quite independently of God's approval or disapproval. They will find it hard to admit that God
even could (though he would not) make something right which we all regard as horribly
wrong. The most famous discussion of this is Euthyphro, in PLATO'S DIALOGUES.
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only if practically everyone who might consider it in the proper manner would concur in it. Under this definition, it is perfectly possible
for a moral proposition which everyone rejects to be true (no one
having really informed himself on the question or considered it attentively and impartially). All definitions of moral truth are of course
controversial, and it would take a great deal of patient study to attempt to do full justice to this one. However, our paradigm does
suggest it, and the discussion which follows assumes that it is correct."5
It seems reasonable to suppose that the structural essentials of a
moral argument on difficult questions are similar to those involved
in very easy questions. This will be suggested by the fact that the
rules of formal inference do not change when we go from simple to
complicated proofs in geometry, and the fact that hypothetico-deductive reasoning in science is basically the same whether we are repeating an elementary experiment or testing a difficult new theory. We
should expect to find that it is possible to justify moral judgments
in cases which are not so utterly one-sided as our paradigm case, and
that this can be done by a type of reasoning that is quite similar to
what has been described in section I. That is, we should expect to
find that the same types of premises and deductive form are needed,
and that the same kind of justification for asserting the premises is
in order, even though it will be less obvious (or not obvious at all)
what the specific content of the premises should be.
This expectation is borne out when we turn to moral questions
in which all of the relevant considerations do not point indisputably
in one direction, but in which the correct judgment is nevertheless
obvious. Thus, for example, assume that I have promised you I would
do something, and you have relied on my promise and will now suffer
a moderate loss if I fail to do it. Assume further that unforeseeable
circumstances now make it utterly disastrous for me to perform as
promised. Practically anyone would agree on reflection that I am not
morally obliged to keep my promise, even if I am unable to make
good your loss. Or, observing that our lunatic will certainly blow up
the train unless we shoot him, practically anyone would agree that it
is morally right to shoot him even though doing so will cause serious
harm to an innocent person. In these cases, there are substantial countervailing considerations which are clearly sufficient. Hence, the "other
things are equal" premise must be rejected, and with it the conclusion
15.

For a further comment on this see the concluding paragraph of this article.

MORAL AND JUDICIAL REASONING

that it would be wrong to break the promise or shoot the man. So
we replace the rejected inference with one we can accept. Thus,
(1) other things being equal, one ought morally to do what
one easily can do to prevent mass destruction of human life;
(2) shooting this one lunatic now is required to prevent such
mass destruction and I easily can shoot him;
(3) other things are equal (i.e., that it will harm him seriously is not sufficient to justify my failing to do it, and there
is nothing else that would justify such failure).
(Therefore) I ought to shoot him.
The reasoning that would be required to justify my accepting
the premises of this argument is the same as that described in section
I. Thus, premise (1) could hardly be questioned by anyone knowing
what "ought morally" means. Premise (2) is an empirical proposition
which could be highly probable (the trestle appears to be mined, he
has repeatedly threatened to blow up the train, he is reaching for the
detonator, etc.). And premise (3) represents my honest judgment
of the relative weight of the two evils involved, the same judgment
that anyone would make. Depending on the circumstances (above
all on how confident we could be of premise (2)), this argument could
also be demonstrative-a valid deduction from premises known to be
true-even though there are facts weighing tragically against our
judgment. 16
There are other moral dilemmas which are not only occasions
for deep regret because some important value must be sacrificed, but
difficult intellectual problems as well. Careful reflection may be necessary before we can be sure which value should be sacrificed, if we
ever can be sure. The considerations on either side may be much
more nearly equal than in the last example, so that people might
easily disagree about their relative importance. For example, I might
have to choose between helping one person who is in dire distress
and keeping my promise to someone else who is desperately depending on me. My doubt might be relieved by learning more of the facts,
but perhaps not; or someone else might judge differently even then.
16. It may be noticed that even Warnock's example is not absolutely one-sided
in theory; after all, the children will probably have euphoric periods as they are becoming addicted. But, as a practical matter, it is entirely one-sided, for that seems a
negligible value which we (informed and impartially reflective people) would recognize
but not regret sacrificing.
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We may also be in serious doubt about whether a certain principle
is morally valid, either to serve as our first premise or to indicate that
certain considerations of fact do have countervailing weight. Many
moral principles which people sincerely accept are, of course, not
self-evident in the way the principles just mentioned seem to be.
Consider the principle that contraception is wrong, or that nontherapeutic abortion after the first months of pregnancy is wrong, or that
civil disobedience in a democracy is wrong. We are not apparently
forced by the very meaning of "morally wrong" to accept them or to
reject them, and of course people often disagree about these and many
other principles.
It seems quite likely that even when they are fully informed and
impartially reflective, people can still sometimes disagree on difficult
moral questions. Of course, the fact that people often are in moral
doubt or disagreement does not prove that they would remain in doubt
or continue to disagree after mature reflection. Certainly there would
be less disagreement if people did reflect more than they do. But since
there is no official canon of valid moral principles, and no official
table of moral weights and measures, it is logically possible that people
should disagree even when exhaustively informed about the subject
of their moral evaluation. Presumably it would sometimes be a
psychological possibility (or probability) as well, if only because of
differences in temperament and moral training.
Now, in cases where there probably would not be a consensus,
but a substantial division of opinion among those who are well informed and impartially reflective, we cannot demonstrate our judgment because at least one of our evaluative premises will not be true
in the sense in which moral evaluations can be true according to the
paradigm. It is not that we cannot be sure that it is true; we know that
it is not true. That is, we know that in all probability it would not be
asserted or accepted by practically everyone who reflected properly.
This does not mean that it is false. It is probably not the case that
practically everyone would reject it. It is neither true nor false. Yet
we are personally justified in asserting our evaluate premises if we
have been properly reflective, and therefore we are justified in asserting the moral statement which follows from them in conjunction
with the verified facts of the case stated in premise (2). Thus, we
can be justified in making a moral judgment which we know is neither
true nor false.
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This is the result of extending to difficult moral judgments the
relationship between "justified" and "true" observed in the. demonstration of a very easy judgment. Justification being logically prior to
the truth, our judgment can be justified even where there is no truth.
Admittedly, it is not now a matter of simply "observing" the same
conceptual structure, as when we confirmed such an expectation in
the relatively easy train explosion case. It is rather a matter of deciding how best to resolve a philosophical doubt by shaping indeterminate concepts one way rather than another. It may seem strange to say
that some of our premises can be neither true nor false, and that our
judgment can be justified not merely when it is false but even when
we know that it is neither true nor false. But there are several good
reasons to say just that about moral judgment or belief, even though
there are also very good reasons not to say it about empirical and
mathematical beliefs. First, as was previously stated, it is plausible
to assume that the nature of good reasoning in problematic cases is
not fundamentally different from what it is in easy cases. Secondly, as
was also mentioned, it seems that our judgment can be rationally
justified without the possibility of truth in quite difficult cases because
justification is independent of truth even in easy cases where one's
justified judgment unquestionably is true. Thirdly, this way of deciding the matter seems to be quite consistent with common verbal
habits and intuitions in morals. People do commonly think and say
that moral questions have true answers, but this is no hindrance because we have already shown that easy (but no less important) moral
questions do have true answers in myriads of cases. It would also be
commonly thought that moral problems requiring some reflection
also admit of true or uniquely "valid" resolutions. This is why it
seems important that one should reflect on moral problems confronting one: to avoid acting or judging wrongly. But our conceptual decision is also consistent with this insofar as the correct answer to a
moral question may not become obvious until the facts of the case
have been investigated and considered by a reasoning mind. Beyond
that, I doubt that people commonly think that every moral question, no matter how difficult, no matter how evenly balanced the arguments pro and con may seem, has one, and only one, correct answer
even though we may never be able to tell what it is. Anyone who has
ever puzzled over a difficult moral problem will probably think such
a view naive; others will probably have no opinion on the point
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(unless they are philosophers puzzling over the epistemology of
morals).
To conclude this section, a word of apology to lawyers: I have
had to use a little more philosophy jargon in the last paragraph or
two, but I shall now turn directly to the judicial side of the analogy.
A word of possible reassurance to philosophers: the legal illustration
which is to be produced in the remainder of the paper may bring
enough support to this controversial view of moral justification and
truth to show that it is seriously worth considering. Let us briefly
restate it. A person is justified in accepting or asserting a moral propo--sition if, and only if, being well informed and impartially reflective,
he feels that it is correct, i.e., that everyone ought (in some primitive
moral sense of "ought") to assent to such proposition. He may know
that everyone does not assent to it. Still, he feels that they all ought to
assent to it. Further, let us say that a person's moral judgment is justified when he is justified in making it. Finally, a moral proposition is
true if, and only if, pratically all properly reflective people would assent
to it. Possibly we can never strictly know (using the word perhaps too
strictly) that a moral proposition is true; but we can comfortably
and plausibly say we know it whenever it is highly probable that
there would be such a consensus, just as we comfortably say that
we know many empirical propositions are true which are highly
probable.
III.
In law as in morals there are myriads of rule applications which
are entirely unproblematic. We can seldom decide the issues of litigated cases so easily, but we all do use legal rules a hundred times a
day with no problem. We stop for a red light, we drive to the right,
we get two witnesses for a will instead of one, and so on. And in law
as in morals the application of a rule is always logically more complex
than it may seem to be in very easy cases. Suppose Jones lies in wait
for Smith, robs him, kills him to prevent being identified, and later
confesses all in open court, offering nothing in extenuation of guilt;
also, he is advised by expert counsel, and is intelligent and psychologically normal according to court-appointed psychiatrists who have
carefully examined him. That he is guilty of first degree murder follows "automatically" from these facts and the statute on homicides;
there is nothing to ponder in applying the statute to him. But, notice
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that in order that the statute shall be so applied to him, it is logically
necessary that his action be considered under a certain description
and not others which would be equally true, i.e., as "the deliberate,
unprovoked killing of a human being" rather than as "causing the
death of a large animal organism" or as "firing a gun." In describing
the actions in the manner first mentioned, we have the second premise
of our deductive form. The first premise is supplied by the unquestionably valid statute which attaches certain legal consequences to
the deliberate unprovoked killing of human beings, namely, that one
is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be punished in such
and such a way. Notice also that the effect of this statute in the present
case could be changed by another, equally valid law. It could make
Jones guilty of murder in the first degree ceteris paribus; that is, guilty
in the absence of any other relevant provisions of law that would
suffice to cancel this effect in his case. Thus, the legislature might
have believed that people (like Jones) who have bright red hair find it
much harder to control their evil impulses, and so might have provided in a separate statute that their guilt shall be reduced by one
"degree" in crimes having degrees. The judge in Jones' case will not
stop to consider this possibility since he knows very well there is no
such statute. But he may expect to be aware of any other, more plausible rules or principles of law affecting Jones' guilt, or to be made
aware of them by counsel. Hearing of none and being aware of none,
he is entitled to assume there are none, and therefore that other
things are equal. So we have the third premise necessary to deduce
the legal conclusion that Jones is guilty of murder in the first degree.
It would be ridiculously pedantic for Jones' judge to spell such
reasoning out or even rehearse it to himself. But this is because it is
such an easy case, and not because its rational structure is especially
simple. There is no need to explain why each of the three premises
may be confidently asserted, or even to think of them separately,
because one is sure to get the right result in such a case without doing
so. But, if one were to explain fully why it is the right result, one
would have to say substantially what I have said in the preceding
paragraph.
In order to justify less obvious legal judgments, the same "form
of reasoning" seems to be required. That is, the same kind of deductive
inference coupled with the same sort of justification for asserting the
premises is necessary. This extension is closely analogous to what we
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have seen in our discussion of moral reasoning. To be sure, the
specific grounds for the legal validity of standards 17 will differ significantly from those we would give to validate moral standards
figuring in a moral argument, although even here there is an important similarity to be noted below. But the selection of valid standards appropriate to the case at hand, the resolution of conflicts between valid standards through varying assignments of "weight" to
relevant facts, and the treatment of doubtfully valid standards,all take
similar patterns in law and morals and are to be justified in closely
analogous ways. These remarks may be illustrated with some well
known cases.' 8
It seems clear that two unquestionably valid legal standards may
conflict in a particular case, i.e., may both logically apply to it and
give opposite directions for its disposition. Several examples of this
conflict appear in the area of constitutional law where no well recognized exceptions or clear indications of priority are available to allow
reconciliation. Certainly the same conflict occurs in other areas of
the law, but it has its most spectacular illustration in the vague
standards of the Constitution, whose frequent conflict give the Supreme Court ever-new opportunities for important policymaking.
Reasonable men may differ on how to resolve particular conflicts between state police power and the contract clause,' between free
speech and the war making power, 20 between the equal protection
clause and the doctrine of "political questions," 21 and so on, even in
light of the available precedents (often because of the great variety of
the precedents). So in many a case there simply is no true way to
resolve the conflict in the sense given to that word by our paradigms
of true moral and legal judgment. Yet, even in such cases, the judges
17. For convenience, I shall use the term "legal standard" hereafter as a catch-all
for legal norms of all kinds: general principles and policies of common law, statutes,
binding precedents, sharply defined rules of property, vague but useful "standards" like
the standard of reasonable care in torts, etc.
18. Here, as in section II, supra, I skip cases of intermediate difficulty, those
which definitely admit of but one correct (legal or moral) judgment, but require some
clear thinking to see what it is. I have in mind problems consisting of two or more very
easy questions arranged in tandem, as it were, a reasoning mind being required to see
both the order in which they should be answered and the logical consequence of answering them in that order.
19. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934);
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
20. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
21. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (the reapportionment cases).
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attempt to justify their judgments and dissenting views; and these
judgments and views often are justified in the sense we gave to this
word in section II, when speaking of justified moral judgments. That
is, the written opinions of the judges often show them to be very
well informed of the legal and factual considerations that are salient
for deciding the case, to have reflected upon and weighed them in an
impartial spirit, and to have constructed a reasonable argument which
expresses their sincere view of the best legal way to dispose of the
conflict.
22
To consider a specific case, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
the Supreme Court was forced to decide whether a statute requiring
mining companies to leave or construct reinforcements under certain
improved lands owned by others was a valid exercise of the police
power, or whether it constituted a taking of property without compensation in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Perhaps the most important consideration favoring the
conclusion that it was such a-taking was the fact that "surface owners"
or their predecessors in title had either purchased their land from
the mining companies or sold mining rights without bargaining or
paying for protection against subterranean shifts. The statute now
gave them such protection at the expense of the companies. On the
other hand, reasonable state regulations for the "health, safety and
morals" of the public may lessen the value of the land or other property interests without necessarily entitling the owners to compensation,
even when an incidental effect is to confer special benefits on some
other members of the public.
Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, which held the statute
unconstitutional, and Justice Brandeis in dissent, both thought the
issue turned on such questions as the value of the property interests
affected, the extent of the diminution of that value, whether the
danger sought to be eliminated constituted a public nuisance, how
extensive a public interest was being protected, whether the regulation was an appropriate means to its intended end, whether it was
required for the safety of persons, and so on. But, in reviewing the
factual background of the regulation and the various precedents cited
by counsel, they gave very different answers to most of these questions,
and their reasons display markedly different emphases of the several
social and legal values quite obviously involved. Not that the two
22.

260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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opinions are necessarily of equal persuasive force; as I reread them
after some years, it seems to me that Brandeis definitely has the
better of the argument. The point is rather that in 1922 there surely
would have been a substantial division of opinion about such a case
among informed and disinterested constitutional lawyers who might
have considered it. All, or practically all, of them would probably not
have voted in the same way. There was no true judgment to render in
the case, but the Court's judgment was nevertheless justified in our
sense of the term. That is, Holmes (and presumably his brethren in the
majority) was justified in the judgment he did render, as the opinion of
the Court sufficiently shows. So also was Brandeis justified in his view,
as his written dissent sufficiently shows. It is no paradox that opposite
judgments may be rationally justified even though they have identical
bases (here, the same Constitution, precedents and facts), if the subject is one which does not admit of a true answer. Of course, the majority's judgment (the product of its act of judgment) has additional
legal justification just because it is the view of the majority.
Holmes' and Brandeis' major reasons and conclusions can be
cast into the same deductive form that we have found in very easy
legal cases and in both easy and doubtful moral cases. For Holmes,
the argument goes approximately as follows:
(1) Other things being equal, a State may not take private
property for public use without paying for it (per the due
process clause).
(2) By this statute, Pennsylvania would take private property (by diminishing or destroying the value of certain interests in land) and would not pay for it.
(3) Other things are equal; i.e., in the circumstances such
taking without compensation is not simply an exercise of the
State's police power, nor has any other sufficient reason
been presented to validate the statute.
(Therefore) The statute is unconstitutional.
Brandeis' argument goes, in effect, as follows:
(1) Other things being equal, the State has the power to
regulate the use of land in the interests of public health,
safety and morals without paying anything to the owners
of land (per the established doctrine of the police power).
(2) Pennsylvania by its statute has made such a regulation.
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(3) Other things are equal; i.e., in the circumstances and
in light of the precedents, the diminuation of the value
of interests in land resulting from such regulation is not a
taking of property as contemplated by the due process clause,
nor has any valid constitutional objection to the statute
been raised.
(Therefore) As far as has been shown, the statute is consti*tutional.
Here, just as in moral arguments which are not completely onesided, we have one standard figuring in premise (1) and another
standard figuring as the basis for alleged countervailing considerations which, however, are denied to be sufficient in premise (3). In
the counter-argument, the positions and functions of these two
standards are reversed, and different facts in the case are stated in
premise (2).
A very important point to notice is that the reasoning on either
side not only can be cast into this deductive form, but must be understood to have this form if it claims to apply the law of the Constitution
to the case at bar. To be sure, our deductive form itself does not show
(and is not the form of) the reasoning which justifies giving one
standard priority over another, i.e., which justifies selecting an arrangement of premises as shown in one of the above-stated deductive
arguments over the other. Also, this latter part of the reasoning (that
is, reasoning to justify such a selection) is more important than the
deductive argument itself because it is far more difficult and debatable.
(There is nothing doubtful or debatable about the validity of simple
deductive forms.) But the deduction is nevertheless an essential part
of the reasoning. For it is only by some such argument that one's
judgment can even claim to be required by the Constitution, that is,
follow from it in conjunction with the facts of the case. The legal
conclusion on which one's judgment in the case rests is justified as a
constitutional conclusion only insofar as one's selection of premises
is justified whereby it can be deduced from the Constitution.
This seemingly obvious point has been obscured by so many
eminent disparagements of "logic," "formal logic," "deductive reasoning," "the syllogism," and so on, as models for judicial reasoning, 28 that
23. See, e.g., Guest, Logic in the Law, in OxFola EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE 176
(A. Guest ed. 1961), citing 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881), and J. STONE,
THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW chs. VI, VII (1946), and many other items pub-
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it may be desirable to restate it in a slightly different way. It has been
said that for a court to reason syllogistically-merely stating a principle of law plus facts of the instant case which together obviously
imply such and such an outcome-"conceals a fatal weakness," because in most cases some other valid principle and some other facts
might have been cited which entail an opposite conclusion.24 This is
very true, and we can make our point by saying that while good
judicial reasoning is not basically syllogistic (since it is a minimum
requirement that judges explain why they prefer one such syllogism
to others that might plausibly be constructed for the case, rather than
just ignoring them), such reasoning nevertheless does have a deductive
form. In that form which we have now repeatedly illustrated, the legal
principle has to be accompanied with a ceteris paribus reservation,
and this forces us to add a third premise that "other things are
equal."-25 This third premise amounts to the explicit claim that no
other principle of law should be allowed to control and dispose of the
case, even if there are some others that logically apply to it in light of
other facts less important than those recited in premise (2). Any
judge worth his salt will make this claim and give his reasons for it.
If he does not, he cannot justify his judgment, i.e., show that he is
justifed in making it, i.e., show that he has been fully informed and
impartially reflective in arriving at it-unless, indeed, the case is so
simple that there are not any competing principles worthy of consideration.
The type of problematic case that we have just been discussing
is one in which two or more valid legal standards, coupled with approlished in intervening years. Law review writers have regularly discussed logic, it not ethical
theory, and the anti-logic tide seems to have turned. See, e.g., Bloustein, Logic and Legal
Realism: The Realist as a Frustrated Idealist, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 24 (1964). An historically ironic note is struck by one writer who urges lawyers not to be so traditionbound and learn symbolic logic, because it is useful in avoiding syntactic ambiguities
when drafting documents. Fitzgerald, Law and Logic, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 570 (1964).
The advice had already been taken at Yale and elsewhere. Anyone who still thinks it
necessary to disparage the use of "logic" is legal reasoning should read Guest's sensible
piece.

24. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 65-66 (1930).
25. Many legal standards are commonly understood to be valid only ceteris paribus
and not universally. For example, the "rule" about how contractual obligations arc
created (offer, acceptance, consideration, etc.) has its well known "exceptions" covering
fraud, duress, mistake, etc. But, even a rule with an official and quite universal formulation (or with a closed list of absolute exceptions, cf. note 10 and accompanying text
supra) such as one finds in many statutes, must still be so qualified. After all, some
other statute (or judicial interpretation thereof) may have equal authority and may
force an exception never mentioned or contemplated by the first statute.
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priate factual descriptions, compete for control of the case. The "winning" combination takes over premises (1) and (2), while the "loser"
or losers are banished to premise (3) in which they are denied sufficient weight, or pertinence, to control the result. Another type of
problematic case, endemic in law, is one in which the legal validity
of standards proposed by either side to control the disposition of the
case is itself in dispute. For example, the wording of a statute will not
be debatable but its meaning and effect (the rule it requires for a case
like the one before the court) often will be. Or, very often the problem will be one of interpreting precedents-of determining what
rule or rules certain earlier decisions should be considered to stand
for, especially in light of the facts of the case at bar which the rule,
once identified, will control. Now, a judge will be justified (in our
sense) in settling the rule or rules required to dispose of the case
if he has examined the problem in a thorough and lawyer-like way,
and has chosen the rule (s) he honestly thinks best for the case. "Best"
here means legally best, of course-the rule (s) which the law can
most plausibly be said to require or impose for such a case. "The law"
here means the pertinent precedents, especially those of the highest
court of the jurisdiction, relevant general policies and principles
known in the judicial literature or reflected in statutes, and "contemporary good sense" as it may tend to qualify or amend older notions about the proper grounds of legal liability.26 Two or more judges
may thus be justified in producing contrary rules for the case before
them if after proper reflection they sincerely disagree about what rule
the law does demand for the case. Whenever there would be a substantial division of informed and disinterested opinion, as there surely
would be about a great many appealed cases, there is, again, no true
rule for the case, except retrospectively by authority of the court's
judgment.
26. It is in this connection that one may note a similarity even in the grounds of
legal and moral validity, mentioned earlier. When a judge has to decide a case that
does not have one correct outcome under existing legal doctrines and authorities, what
he is doing is not only structurally similar to what one does in deciding a problematic
moral "case"; his decision is itself (in one sense) a moral decision. Deciding in a way
that seems to be "fair and reasonable" or to "make sense" is deciding morally. Yet, even
here it is not the judge's personal moral opinion that ought to prevail. The professionally
conscientious judge will cite widely held moral views for his decision-not his own
views as such, and not his own views at all if they are very eccentric. See L. JAFFE,
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWM AXERS 44-47 (1969). Jaffe thinks a judge
whose personal moral view would not coincide with any opinion widely held in the
community should adopt the "representative opinion which most satisfies his conscience
or his intelligence." Id. at 47.
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I take it that these last remarks would no longer be thought controversial by most academic lawyers and scholarly judges. But I also
wish to maintain that a legal standard, thus justifiably asserted to be
valid, will appear as premise (1) in our form, and that the form will
continue to be an essential aspect of judicial reasoning in this type
of problematic case. Let us look at another famous decision with this
point in mind.
In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 7 the New York Court of
Appeals brought to a close the century-long development often referred to as the rise and decline of the "inherently dangerous" rule. 28
During the latter half of the ninetenth century, the common law rule
that manufacturers are not liable in negligence to remote purchasers
had been qualified with an exception covering implements of destruction that are dangerous by nature and without latent defects
(e.g., explosives, poisons, etc.). In adding this exception, the courts
had relied on a number of earlier cases going back to Dixon v. Bell.2
Subsequent decisions had expanded the category of inherently dangerous articles until, in MacPherson and its British cousin, Donoghue v.
Stevenson,8" the exception finally "swallowed up" the rule that manufacturers are not liable to consumers with whom they are not in privity
of contract. It was no longer necessary that a product be inherently
dangerous in the sense just noted. It was enough if the thing by its
nature were fairly certain to endanger life if negligently made, as
where an undetected defect is extremely dangerous and probably
would not be discovered by the "middle man" or the ultimate
purchaser and user until an accident occurred.
By far the most important part of Judge Cardozo's explicit
reasoning in MacPherson is given to supporting this new statement of
the law. Thus, Cardozo went to considerable length to show how in
his opinion, both the older and more recent cases may be said to require the court's result as they can be marshaled into a coherent doctrine. No doubt he also personally thought (but did not make explicit in his majority opinion) that such a rule is more appropriate
under modem conditions of mass production and mass distribution
27. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
28. Often used to illustrate the "nature of the judicial process" and the "growth
of the law" (to use two of Cardozo's title-phrases), this development is traced in a
very concise and illuminating way in E. Lnvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
8-27 (1948).
29. 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (1816).
30. [1932] A.C. 562 (Scot.).
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of products. 81 But once such a rule was adopted, the decision in the
case could be legally extracted from it only through an inference
which goes approximately as follows:
(1) Other things being equal, a manufacturer is liable in
neglience for personal injuries to users of his product if the
product by its nature is fairly certain to endanger life if
negligently made.
(2) In this case, the plaintiff's injuries did result from the
defendant manufacturer's negligence (in failing to inspect
a defective wheel supplied to it by another company), and
the defective product was fairly certain to endanger life (in
case the wheel collapsed, as actually happened).
(3) Other things are equal.
(Therefore) This defendant is liable to this plaintiff.
Such a conclusion obviously would follow from (1) and (2) without (3) if we eliminated the words "other things being equal" from
(1). But, while that would be logically valid, it would be legally invalid-bad law. That a certain true statement of facts brings a case
under a certain valid rule of law is never a sufficient reason for deciding the case accordingly. It is also necessary that other facts of the
case (and there always are other facts) and other valid rules should
not override the facts and rule first mentioned, as we saw even in our
open-and-shut case of first-degree murder. In MacPherson,for example,
the plaintiff would probably not have been entitled to recover had
he signed a three-party agreement with the dealer and the manufacturer releasing them from liability as part of his purchase. Of course,
various other imaginable facts would preclude, or arguably would
preclude, such a conclusion in the light of valid legal standards. The
court is justified in its conclusion, then, only if it would be justified
in holding that there were no such countervailing facts in the case,
or at least none sufficient to defeat or prevent that conclusion.
The reader will probably have noticed that our two types of
problematic cases overlap. Thus, the due process clause is unquestionably a "valid standard," but its meaning and effect for a given
case will oftdn be subject to debate, and this debate will often
proceed by an examination of precedents in which the clause has
previously been applied. Further types of problematic cases could
31. Cf. B. CARnozo, THE

GROWTH OF THE LAW, chs.

II, III (1924).
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readily be formulated, and they would also overlap with the first
two. To mention but one: we have dealt with legal problems affecting
the content of premises (1) and (3), but mixed questions of law and
fact must often be answered in deciding on the proper content of
premise (2), a point which is reminiscent of the moral illustration
in section I where we saw that the descriptive category "causes severe
harm" is partly evaluative. We have an illustration in MacPherson
when the Buick Company is said (in premise (2)) to have been
"negligent" in not inspecting a wheel received from another manufacturer.
But perhaps it will be unnecessary to give further examples. I
suggest that we have now seen enough to hazard the following generalizations. Every judicial decision is supposed to be "principled,"
i.e., to result from the application of some general standard to the
facts of the individual case. The legally valid application of any such
standard presupposes that there are no sufficient legal reasons for
not applying it-as, logically, there always could be, since no legal
standard can be guaranteed by its creators to be absolutely without
exception, even though it be worded quite universally. Therefore,
every legally justified decision requires a deductive inference of the
form illustrated above; and it must also be the case that the judge
would be justified, in the sense indicated above, in asserting each one
of the three premises needed to entail his judgment.
IV.
What conclusions can we now draw about judicial reasoning in
problematic cases? To take the easiest and safest point first, it seems
quite clear that good judicial reasoning must make use of our deductive form whether or not judges can justify their judgments in the
strong sense of showing that the law really requires them. (Of course,
they always can "justify" their judgments in the weak sense of giving
some sort of reasons for them.) As we have repeatedly noticed, even
to attempt a justification in the stronger sense involves the deductive
application of some legal standard or other, plus the claim that it is
the controlling standard for the case.
One need not insist that this simple deductive inference be laid
out in a pedantically obvious way. It will be obvious enough if the
court explains in its opinion why a certain standard is valid law, is
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applicable to the case before it, and properly controls that case despite
contentions of counsel that such a case should be disposed of in some
other way by invoking some other standard,- Writers like Jerome
Frank who have complained that judges often argue "syllogistically"
in their opinions have presumably meant to imply that judges ought
to give such fuller explanations instead. If so, we may perhaps credit
such writers with having long ago insisted on the use of our form,
at least in a vague sort of way. By using ceteris paribus phrases and
premises (a prominent topic in moral philosophy of the past decade)
perhaps we have only made their point a bit clearer and more secure.
Yet, addicted as they were to general aspersions of "deductive logic"
in legal reasoning, the legal realists could not have been expected to
spell out that form. In not spelling it out, they paid a price. They
missed the opportunity to see that this sort of inference might be
part of a larger form of reasoning-that a good judge might not only
be conscious of, and explicit about preferring one syllogism to another, but might also be able to justify his preference rationally and
legally. In other words, they did not go on to consider whether and
how the content of the three premises of such an inference might be
justified.
In this paper, I have tried to sketch such a larger form by using
a sense of "justified" which seems appropriate for several reasons.
First, being informed and impartially reflective is a mode of rationality which is available even when uniquely correct arguments and
results are not. Second, even if the existing law does not uniquely
determine the substantive result in many a problematic case, we can
still say that the result is legally justified if the court has satisfied the
standards of judicial temperament, competence, and care which are
the legal expression of that mode of rationality.
Third, it might be objected that such a sense of "justified" is
tailor-made for the problem of how legal decisions can be justified
when they are not uniquely law-determined, so that its use is only a
form of question-begging. But our analogy, including our discussion
of very easy cases whether in law or morals, shows that this is not so.
Reasoning which would be commonly regarded as good reasoning in
problematic legal cases has been shown to be identical in structure with
reasoning in cases which unquestionably have but one correct judgment and supporting argument. That is, they have the same deductive
32. See J. FRANx, supra note 24.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

form and the same sense in which one is justified in asserting the
premises of the deduction.
In summary, we have not refuted but circumvented the argument
that, because the result reached by a court in a problematic case is
not uniquely determined by the existing law, it cannot possibly be
justified. What cannot be justified, ex hypothesi, is any claim by the
court that the result was uniquely determined by law. But, what can
be justified is a claim that the result was obtained by a rationally and
professionally justified application of relevant legal standards.
I have mainly argued that our analogy is useful for basic legal
theory. But while that is no doubt the right side to emphasize in a
law review article, I will end by saying why I think the analogy may
be equally useful for moral philosophy. Just as it suggests a solution
to a problem about judicial reasoning, it also is highly relevant to
the perennial philosophical puzzle that although "we all know perfectly well" that some moral judgments are true and their contraries
false, there apparently is no way to show this. The suggestion here
is that, in morals, evaluative truth is not deducibility from facts and
unchallengeable standards (as it is in some types of evaluation), but
consensus of those who reflect properly, i.e., as required by procedural
standards for good moral reasoning and decision-making. Thus, many
moral judgments would be true and their contraries false, while many
others would be neither true nor false but nevertheless justified (or
unjustified). I hope to pursue this suggestion in another place, but
the present article may at least have shown that it deserves to be
pursued. If philosophers are uncomfortable with the notion of "rationally justifying" evaluations which altogether lack "truth value,"
they may gain some reassurance from the fact that a type of reflection
and argument which has been practiced by a large group of professionals since time out of mind, recorded in vast literature, and regarded by others as an important type of justificatory reasoning, also
relies essentially on that same notion. 38
33. Part of the work of testing such a philosophical hypothesis would consist of
reexamining the whole notion of (justificatory) reasoning to see whether judicial reasoning (and hence moral reasoning, given its structural similarity) are really entitled to be
called reasoning. That was this author's project in Perry, judicial Method and the Concept of Reasoning, 80 ETHICS 1 (1969).
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